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1 Introduction
Trading with demand schedules, in the form of double auctions, is common in many financial
and commodity markets. In a typical model of divisible double auctions, traders simultane-
ously submit linear demand schedules (i.e., a set of limit orders, or price-quantity pairs), and
trading occurs at the market-clearing price. A large literature is devoted to characterizing
the trading behavior in this mechanism as well as the associated price discovery and al-
locative efficiency (see, for example, Kyle (1989), Vayanos (1999), Vives (2011), Rostek and
Weretka (2012), and Du and Zhu (2016), among others). These models of double auctions
typically require at least three traders for the existence of linear equilibria.
When there are exactly two traders, the existing theory predicts a market breakdown
(no trade) unless traders’ values are negatively correlated. While the n ≥ 3 assumption
is relatively innocuous for centralized markets, it is restrictive for decentralized, over-the-
counter (OTC) markets, where trades are conducted bilaterally. Active OTC markets for
divisible assets include those for corporate bonds, municipal bonds, structured products,
interbank loans, repurchase agreements, and security lending arrangements, as well as spot
and forward transactions in commodities and foreign currencies.
In this paper, we fill this gap by studying bilateral trading in divisible double auctions,
which is largely unexplored in the previous literature. In our model, each trader receives a
one-dimensional private signal about the asset and values the asset at a weighted average
of his and the other trader’s signals. That is, values are interdependent. In addition, the
trader’s marginal value for owning the asset declines linearly in quantity. Moreover, the
traders can be asymmetric, in the sense that their values can have different weights on each
other’s signal, and that their marginal values can decline at different rates.
We characterize a family of nonlinear equilibria in this model. These equilibria can be
ranked by their realized allocative efficiency, suggesting that efficiency is a natural equilib-
rium selection criterion. In an equilibrium, each trader’s demand schedule is implicitly given
by a solution to a nonlinear algebraic equation. We show that each equilibrium leads to a
trading quantity that is positive and strictly lower (in absolute values) than the first best
(efficient quantity). This behavior is consistent with the “demand reduction” property com-
monly seen in multi-unit auctions (see, for example, Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and
Weretka (2014)). Moreover, the equilibria that we characterize are ex post equilibria; that
is, the equilibrium strategies remain optimal even if each trader would observe the private
information of the other trader. In the special case of constant marginal values, we obtain
a trader’s equilibrium demand schedule in closed form: it is simply a constant multiple of a
power function of the difference between the trader’s signal and the price, where the exponent
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is decreasing in the weight a trader assigns on his own signal.
Do these nonlinear ex post equilibria also exist in markets with at least three traders?
We show that no nonlinear ex post equilibria exist if: (i) there are at least four symmetric
traders or (ii) there are three symmetric traders who have pure private values. Thus, under
fairly general conditions the only ex post equilibrium is the linear one identified in previous
models. Not only does this result provide a justification for the widespread use of the linear
equilibrium in the existing literature, it also suggests that bilateral double auctions behave
qualitatively differently from multilateral ones, and hence merit further investigation.
An interesting and useful direction of further exploration is to use our bilateral double
auction result as a strategic building block for analyzing dynamic trading in large OTC
markets. So far, in the most widely used class of OTC market models that start from Duffie,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), the two agents in a pairwise meeting observe, by assumption,
each other’s valuation of the asset or continuation value, and trading happens by Nash
bargaining (a split of total surplus by fixed portions). In contrast, the bilateral double auction
in our model endogenously reveals asymmetric information to both counterparties through
their fully strategic interactions. Thus, our model provides a strategic microfoundation for
bilateral information transmission.
More recently, Duffie, Malamud, and Manso (DMM, 2014) use indivisible bilateral double
auctions, adapted from the literature pioneered by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and
Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), to model bilateral trading in large OTC markets. Our
model of divisible double auctions allows arbitrary quantities and is hence better suited for
modeling trade size and trading volume in OTC markets. Moreover, relative to DMM, our
model allows more general information structures such as interdependent values. Finally, our
model of bilateral trade is more tractable than that of DMM, partly because the divisible
double auction allows optimization price by price, greatly simplifying the problem. Of course,
our model has only two agents and is static. Extending it to a fully dynamic market with
many (perhaps a continuum of) agents is an intriguing and important challenge that we
leave for future research.
Our paper is also broadly related to the mechanism-design approach to bilateral trading.
For example, in a bilateral trading setting with interdependent values, finite signals, and
constant marginal values, Shimer and Werning (2015) show that mechanisms satisfying ex
post participation constraints also present a tension between achieving efficiency and having
fully revealing prices. Applying a similar mechanism design approach to our setting seems
an interesting exercise and is left for future research.
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2 Model
There are n = 2 players, whom we call “traders,” trading a divisible asset. The total supply
of the asset is normalized to zero. Each trader i observes a private signal, si ∈ [s, s] ⊂ R,
about the value of the asset. The distribution of (s1, s2) is arbitrary. We use j to denote the
trader other than i. Trader i’s value for owning the asset is:
vi = αisi + (1− αi)sj, (1)
where α1 ∈ (0, 1] and α2 ∈ (0, 1] are commonly known constants that capture the level of
interdependence in traders’ valuations. We assume that α1 + α2 > 1. We do not need the
assumption of αi > 1/2 (placing more weight on one’s own signal).
Remark. Du and Zhu (2016) derive the symmetric case (α1 = α2 ∈ (0, 1]) of the valuations
(1) in a setting where traders have common and private values and observe private, noisy
signals of the common value. We emphasize that the contribution of this paper is to analyze
the case of αi ∈ (0, 1], so each trader i places a nonnegative weight 1 − αi on the other’s
information. In all previous models of divisible double auctions, as long as values have a
nonnegative correlation, the existence of linear equilibrium requires n ≥ 3. If, however,
αi > 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the two traders’ values become negatively correlated. In and only
in this case of negative value correlation, the linear equilibrium in Vives (2011, p. 1941–2)
and Rostek and Weretka (2012) generates a positive trading volume with two traders.
We further assume that trader i’s marginal value for owning the asset decreases linearly
in quantity at a commonly known rate λi ≥ 0. Thus, if trader i acquires quantity qi at the
price p, trader i has the ex post utility:
Ui(qi, p; vi) = viqi − λi
2
(qi)
2 − pqi. (2)
By construction, if qi = 0, then Ui = 0. This linear-quadratic utility function is also used in
Vives (2011), Rostek and Weretka (2012), Du and Zhu (2016), among others.
The trading mechanism is an one-shot divisible double auction. We use xi( · ; si), where
xi( · ; si) : [s, s] → R, to denote the demand schedule that trader i submits conditional on
his signal si. The demand schedule xi( · ; si) specifies that trader i wishes to buy a quantity
xi(p; si) of the asset at the price p when xi(p; si) is positive, and that trader i wishes to sell
a quantity −xi(p; si) of the asset at the price p when xi(p; si) is negative.
Given the submitted demand schedules (x1( · ; s1), x2( · ; s2)), the auctioneer (a human or
a computer algorithm) determines the transaction price p∗ ≡ p∗(s1, s2) from the market-
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clearing condition
x1(p
∗; s1) + x2(p∗; s2) = 0. (3)
After p∗ is determined, trader i is allocated the quantity xi(p∗; si) of the asset and pays
xi(p
∗; si)p∗. If no market-clearing price exists, there is no trade, and each trader gets a
utility of zero. If multiple market-clearing prices exist, we can pick one arbitrarily.
We make no assumption about the distribution of (s1, s2). Therefore, the solution concept
that we use is ex post equilibrium. In an ex post equilibrium, each trader has no regret—he
would not deviate from his strategy even if he would learn the signal of the other trader.
Definition 1. An ex post equilibrium is a profile of strategies (x1, x2) such that for every
profile of signals (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2, every trader i has no incentive to deviate from xi, given
the strategy xj, j 6= i. That is, for any alternative strategy x˜i of trader i,
Ui(xi(p
∗; si), p∗; vi) ≥ Ui(x˜i(p˜; si), p˜; vi),
where vi is given by Equation (1), p
∗ is the market-clearing price given xi and xj, and p˜ is
the market-clearing price given x˜i and xj.
In an ex post equilibrium, a trader can guarantee a non-negative ex post utility, since he
can earn zero utility by submitting a demand schedule that does not clear the market (and
hence trading zero quantity).
The ex post nature of the equilibrium implies that the equilibrium outcome is also robust
to the way it is implemented. For instance, traders do not have to submit their demands at
all prices simultaneously: they may go back and forth proposing prices and quantities that
are subset of their demand schedules, until a market-clearing price emerges. Even if one
trader learns something about the other’s signal and demand schedule, the trader has no
incentive to deviate from his ex post equilibrium demand schedule, as required by the ex post
optimality condition. This robustness-to-implementation property is particularly desirable
in bilateral trading in practice, where the bargaining protocol is usually not specified in rule
books and is subject to high degrees of discretion and variation.
4
3 Characterize a Family of Ex Post Equilibria
We first define the sign function:
sign(z) =

1 z > 0
0 z = 0
−1 z < 0
. (4)
Proposition 1. Suppose that 1 < α1 + α2 < 2. Let C be any positive constant such that
C ≥ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α2
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
, and (5)
C ≥ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α1
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
. (6)
Then, there exists a family (parameterized by C) of ex post equilibria in which:
xi(p; si) = yi(|si − p|) · sign(si − p), i ∈ {1, 2}, (7)
where, for w1, w2 ∈ [0, s− s], y1(w1) and y2(w2) are the smaller solutions to
(2− α1 − α2)w1 = Cα2y1(w1)α1+α2−1 −
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)
y1(w1), (8)
(2− α1 − α2)w2 = Cα1y2(w2)α1+α2−1 −
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
)
y2(w2). (9)
There is a unique equilibrium price p∗ = p∗(s1, s2), which is in between s1 and s2 and is
given implicitly by1
p∗ =
α1s1 + α2s2
α1 + α2
+
α1λ2 − α2λ1
2(α1 + α2)
x1(p
∗; s1). (10)
Moreover, among the family of equilibria, the one corresponding to the smallest C, subject
to Conditions (5)–(6), maximizes trading volume and is the most efficient.
1The uniqueness of solution p∗ to Equation (10) can be seen as follows: suppose α1λ2 > α2λ1, then the
left-hand side of Equation (10) is increasing in p∗, while the right-hand side is decreasing in p∗.
If α1λ2 < α2λ1, rewrite Equation (10) as:
p∗ =
α1s1 + α2s2
α1 + α2
+
α2λ1 − α1λ2
2(α1 + α2)
x2(p
∗; s2),
and then we can apply the above argument.
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Figure 1: Equilibria from Proposition 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates two equilibria of Proposition 1. The primitive parameters are
α1 = 0.7, α2 = 0.8, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, s = 0, and s = 1. The realized signals are s1 = 0.3
and s2 = 0.7. On the left-hand plot, we show the equilibrium with C = 0.729, which is the
equilibrium that maximizes trading volume. The equilibrium price is p∗ = 0.5126, trader 1
gets x1(p
∗; s1) = −0.037, and trader 2 gets x2(p∗; s2) = 0.037. On the right-hand plot, we
show the equilibrium with C = 1.458. The equilibrium price is p∗ = 0.513, trader 1 gets
x1(p
∗; s1) = −0.009, and trader 2 gets x2(p∗; s2) = 0.009.
While the full proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Section A.1, we briefly discuss its
intuition here. The conditions (5)–(6) guarantee that the algebraic equations (8)–(9) have
solutions. For example, the right-hand side of Equation (8), rewritten as
f1(y1) ≡ Cα2yα1+α2−11 −
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)
y1, (11)
is clearly a concave function of y1. Condition (5) ensures that the maximum of f1(y1) is
above (2− α1 − α2)(s− s). Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, a solution exists.
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Moreover, whenever the inequality (5) is strict, there always exist two solutions y1(w1),
one of which is smaller than y∗1 and one larger than y
∗
1, where y
∗
1 maximizes f1(y1). Between
the two, we select the former, for the following reason. It is easy to see that the smaller
solution y1(w1) is increasing in w1 because f1(y1) is increasing in y1 before it obtains its
maximum. This means that trader 1’s demand x1(p; s1) is decreasing in price p and is
increasing in signal s1, by (7). The other solution implies an upward-sloping demand schedule
and should be discarded. Likewise for Condition (6) and Equation (9).
In these equilibria, each trader i buys yi(si − p) units of asset if the price p is below his
signal si; he sells yi(p−si) units if p is above si. The constant C represents the aggressiveness
of the bidding strategy; the smaller is C, the larger is yi(|si − p|), and hence the more
aggressive the traders bid at each price.2 The most aggressive equilibrium is also the most
efficient one, because it maximizes the trading volume. In Section 3.2 we show that in all
equilibria of Proposition 1 and for every realization of signals, the trading volume is less than
that in the ex post efficient allocation, so a higher volume is closer to the ex post efficient
allocation. On the other hand, as C tends to infinity, yi(wi) tends to zero, and hence the
amount of trading in equilibrium tends to zero. Among this family of ex post equilibria, the
most efficient one is a natural candidate for equilibrium selection. It is also worth mentioning
that we have not ruled out the existence of equilibria with other functional forms for demand.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the equilibrium demand xi(p; si) is a concave function of p for
p ≤ si and a convex function of p for p ≥ si. This is a consequence of yi(wi) being convex
in wi (see Lemma 1). Put differently, each trader’s price impact of buying or selling an
additional marginal unit is decreasing in the overall (unsigned) traded quantity. To see this,
note that the price impact of trader j 6= i in the bilateral double auction can be measured
by 1/|∂xi
∂p
| = 1/y′i(wi), where wi = |si − p|. So the price impact is infinite if si = p (since
y′(0) = 0 from Lemma 1) and is smaller if si is further away from p (since y′i(wi) is increasing
in wi). In general, the price impact is larger if |si − p|/(s − s) is smaller. If s → −∞ or
s → ∞, for any fixed si − p, |si − p|/(s − s) → 0, and the price impact at such p becomes
infinitely large, so its trading volume vanishes. That is, if the support of signals and prices
is literally infinite, then the price impact faced by each trader is infinite almost everywhere,
and the only equilibrium is the no trade equilibrium. However, as long as s and s are finite,
trading volume is positive unless si = sj, and the trading volume at a price far away from
si and sj is still large.
An economic interpretation of the nonlinear demand schedule and the decreasing price
impact in quantity is the following. Without loss of generality, consider the buyer. In the
2See Equations (8) and (9): as C gets larger, yi(wi) must become smaller since the left-hand sides of (8)
and (9) are not changing.
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nonlinear equilibrium, the equilibrium price is increasing and concave in the buyer’s purchase
quantity (see Figure 1 for illustration). The strategic buyer wishes to engage in demand
reduction to lower the price, but for each unit of demand reduction, the corresponding price
reduction will be proportionally smaller than what it would be if the seller’s demand schedule
were linear. This nonlinear effect discourages demand reduction, especially if the traded
quantity is already large. That the price impact is smaller for larger quantities resembles the
familiar idea in mechanism design that “low types” are penalized so that high types would
not imitate them (the incentive compatibility condition). From the perspective of the seller
who posts the schedule, a “high type” is a buyer whose signal is far above the seller’s signal,
and a “low type” is a buyer whose signal is just above the seller’s signal. Again, it is as if
the seller sets a highly punitive price impact at a price close to her signal so as to prevent a
high type buyer from “imitating” a low type one. Now suppose that we push the support of
signals to the entire real line. Then, any finite signal of the buyer, say s1, appears very low
relative to the best possible realization, +∞. The seller then sets a punitive, in fact infinite,
price impact at the price p that is generated by s1 and the seller’s signal s2. As s1 varies,
this price p spans the entire real line, and no trade takes place.3
Our nonlinear equilibria are broadly related to those of Glebkin (2015), who analyzes
strategic trading among at least three strategic traders with symmetric information, CARA
utility, and a general asset payoff distribution (in particular, without assuming normality).
His equilibria and ours both demonstrate nonlinear price impact in traded quantity, but the
shapes of the reactions are sometimes different. In our model, the equilibrium price is a
concave function of the quantity demanded and is symmetric for buys and sells. But in his
model, depending on the asset payoff distribution, the equilibrium price may be concave or
convex in quantity, and the magnitudes may differ between buys and sells. This difference is
likely due to the difference between the CARA utility in his model and the linear-quadratic
utility in ours. Glebkin’s model offers richer shapes of price impact in a centralized mar-
ket with at least three traders, whereas our model is applicable to bilateral trading with
interdependent values.4 The two papers are hence complementary.
3Of course, this mechanism design analogy is informal and meant to illustrate the intuition. Formally
applying the mechanism design approach to our setting (for example, by following Shimer and Werning
(2015)) is beyond the scope of the paper.
4Glebkin (2015) does not consider the case of exactly two traders. In his setting, if there are only two
traders and if the asset payoff is normal, an equilibrium does not exist. It remains an open question of under
what payoff distributions an equilibrium would exist in Glebkin’s setting if there are only two traders.
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3.1 Special Cases of Proposition 1
3.1.1 Constant Marginal Values
In the special case that the marginal values do not decline with quantity (λ1 = λ2 = 0), we
obtain explicit closed-form solutions.
Corollary 1. Suppose that α1 + α2 > 1 and λ1 = λ2 = 0. There exists a family of ex post
equilibria in which:
xi(p; si) = C|αi(si − p)|
1
α1+α2−1 · sign(si − p), i ∈ {1, 2}, (12)
where C is any positive constant, and the equilibrium price is independent of C and is given
by
p∗(s1, s2) =
α1
α1 + α2
s1 +
α2
α1 + α2
s2. (13)
Corollary 1 shows that if λ1 = λ2 = 0, the equilibrium price p
∗(s1, s2) tilts toward the
signal of the trader who assigns a larger weight on his private signal.
Corollary 1 imposes no restriction on the positive constant C since the marginal value
does not decline with quantity. While trading volume can be unbounded in theory, in practice
it is often bounded by institutional constraints. For instance, a bank may have an internal
risk management policy that mandates an explicit maximal loan amount, say Q > 0, to each
firm it lends to. In this case, the marginal value of the bank or the borrower is constant if
the quantity qi ∈ [−Q,Q] and is zero if qi 6∈ [−Q,Q]. The equilibria in Corollary 1 apply to
this situation if the constant C satisfies |xi(p; si)| ≤ Q for every (p, si) ∈ [s, s]2 and i = 1, 2,
and the most aggressive equilibrium is one such that max(x1(s; s), x2(s; s)) = Q.
We now construct the equilibria for Corollary 1 to illustrate the general construction in
Proposition 1.
Given a signal profile (s1, s2), trader i’s ex post optimization problem is essentially se-
lecting a market-clearing price p and getting the residual supply −xj(p; sj), j 6= i. Thus, his
ex post first order condition is that of a monopsonist facing a market supply of −xj(p; sj):
∂Ui
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
= xj(p
∗; sj) + (αisi + (1− αi)sj − p∗)
(
−∂xj
∂p
(p∗; sj)
)
= 0. (14)
Let us conjecture that the market-clearing price p∗ satisfies Equation (13). Consequently
trader i can infer sj from p
∗. Substituting (13) into Equation (14), we get:
xj(p
∗; sj) + (1− αi − αj)(sj − p∗)
(
−∂xj
∂p
(p∗; sj)
)
= 0, (15)
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i.e., trader i’s ex post first order condition becomes a differential equation on trader j’s
strategy. It is easy to solve the above differential equation:
xj(p
∗; sj) = Kj(sj − p∗)1/(αi+αj−1), (16)
for any constant Kj. We can choose a constant Kj for sj > p
∗, and another one for sj < p∗.
Thus we let
xj(p
∗; sj) = Cj|sj − p∗|1/(αi+αj−1) sign(sj − p∗) (17)
for a positive constant Cj, to make xj(p
∗; sj) a decreasing function of p∗ and thus a legitimate
demand schedule. To satisfy our conjecture in Equation (13), we let Cj = C · (αj)1/(αi+αj−1)
for a positive constant C, j = 1, 2, which gives the equilibrium strategy in Corollary 1.
Finally, we explicitly verify that our construction satisfies the ex post optimality condition
in Section A.1.3.
3.1.2 Pure Private Values
Pure private values correspond to α1 = α2 = 1. Strictly speaking, private values are not
covered by Proposition 1, but one can easily obtain ex post equilibria using the same line of
arguments as in Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose that α1 = α2 = 1. Let C1 and C2 be positive constants satisfying
C1 − C2 = λ1 − λ2
2
, (18)
and
Ci ≥ λ1 + λ2
2
(
log
2(s− s)
λ1 + λ2
+ 1
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}. (19)
There exists a family (parameterized by C1 and C2) of ex post equilibria in which:
xi(p; si) = yi(|si − p|) · sign(si − p), i ∈ {1, 2}, (20)
where, for wi ∈ [0, s− s], yi(wi) is the smaller solution to
wi = Ciyi(wi)− λ1 + λ2
2
yi(wi) log(yi(wi)). (21)
There is a unique equilibrium price p∗ = p∗(s1, s2), which is in between s1 and s2 and is
given implicitly by
p∗ =
s1 + s2
2
+
λ2 − λ1
4
x1(p
∗; s1). (22)
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Moreover, among the family of equilibria, the one corresponding to the smallest C1 and
C2, subject to Conditions (18)–(19), maximizes trading volume and is the most efficient.
As in Proposition 1, the right-hand side of Equation (21) is a concave function of yi(wi).
Condition (19) ensures that Equation (21) has two solutions in yi(wi), and the smaller of the
two solutions increases with wi. Moreover, the smaller is the constant Ci, the more aggressive
is trader i’s equilibrium strategy in Equation (21). Hence, the most efficient equilibrium of
this family corresponds to the smallest possible C1 and C2.
3.1.3 Pure Common Value
Pure common value corresponds to the case of α1 +α2 = 1. While pure common value is not
covered by our model, we cover cases arbitrarily close to pure common value, i.e., α1+α2 > 1
can be arbitrarily close to 1. We show here that as we approach a common value setting
the equilibrium trade disappears, which is consistent with the intuitions from the no trade
theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
Corollary 3. Suppose that λ1 + λ2 > 0. As α1 + α2 tends to 1, trading vanishes in every
equilibrium (x1, x2) from Proposition 1:
lim
α1+α2→1
sup
(p,si)∈[s,s]2
|xi(p; si)| = 0, (23)
for every i ∈ {1, 2}.
We do not require a trader placing more weight on his own signal. We allow, for example,
that α1 = 1 and α2 =  > 0, where  is small. When the signals s1 and s2 are independent,
this information structure corresponds to a “lemon” setting in which player 1 is perfectly
informed about the almost-common value, while player 2 is very uninformed. The above
result implies that the equilibrium trade must vanish as → 0.
3.2 Demand Reduction and Efficiency
Now, we turn to the efficiency properties of the bilateral ex post equilibria of Proposition 1.
To guarantee the existence of the efficient allocation, we will assume that λ1 + λ2 > 0.
Otherwise (i.e., if λ1 = λ2 = 0), the allocative efficiency can always be improved by moving
a marginal unit of asset from the trader with a lower value to the trader with a higher value.
For welfare comparison, let us first sketch the competitive equilibrium. A competitive
equilibrium demand schedule xci(p
c; si) takes the price as given (each trader has no effect on
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the price) and solves:
xci(p
c; si) ∈ argmax
qi∈R
vi(si, p
c)qi − λi(qi)
2
2
− pcqi, (24)
where vi(si, p
c) is trader i’s value given signal si and competitive equilibrium price p
c. With
only two traders, the competitive equilibrium is meant to be a theoretical benchmark and
not a realistic description of market reality.
Let us conjecture that the competitive equilibrium price satisfies:
pc = a1s1 + a2s2. (25)
Trader i infers from the competitive equilibrium price pc:
vi(si, p
c) = αisi + (1− αi)sj = αisi + (1− αi)p
c − aisi
aj
, (26)
and as a result,
xci(p
c; si) =
1
λi
(
αisi + (1− αi)p
c − aisi
aj
− pc
)
. (27)
The competitive equilibrium price satisfies xc1(p
c; s1) + x
c
2(p
c; s2) = 0, thus
pc =
(
α1
λ1
− a1(1−α1)
a2λ1
)
s1 +
(
α2
λ2
− a2(1−α2)
a1λ2
)
s2
1
λ1
− 1−α1
a2λ1
+ 1
λ2
− 1−α2
a1λ2
. (28)
Matching the above coefficients with those in (25) gives the following unique non-trivial
solution:
a1 =
(1− α2)λ1 + α1λ2
λ1 + λ2
, a2 =
(1− α1)λ2 + α2λ1
λ1 + λ2
. (29)
Substitute the above solution into Equations (25) and (27) gives the competitive equilibrium:
xci(p; si) =
α1 + α2 − 1
αjλi + (1− αi)λj (si − p), j 6= i, (30)
pc =
(1− α2)λ1 + α1λ2
λ1 + λ2
s1 +
(1− α1)λ2 + α2λ1
λ1 + λ2
s2. (31)
It is easy to see that the competitive equilibrium always obtains the ex post efficient
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allocation: for every (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2,
x1(p
c; s1) ∈ argmax
q1∈R
v1q1 − λ1
2
(q1)
2 + v2(−q1)− λ2
2
(−q1)2. (32)
Proposition 2. Suppose that λ1 + λ2 > 0.
1. For every ex post equilibrium (x1, x2) of Proposition 1 and for every signal profile
(s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2, the ex post equilibrium trades strictly less than the ex post efficient
allocation: |x1(p∗; s1)| < |xc1(pc; s1)|.
2. The ex post equilibrium prices from Proposition 1 and the competitive equilibrium price
are the same if and only if λ1α2 = λ2α1.
Thus, when traders are asymmetric, the price in a strategic equilibrium is generally
different from that in the competitive equilibrium. The prices are equal if and only if
λ1α2 = λ2α1, which is not an obvious result ex ante. Intuitively, if λ1/λ2 is larger, trader 1
is less aggressive than trader 2 due to a higher inventory cost; but if α1/α2 is larger, trader 1
is more aggressive than trader 2 because a larger fraction of trader 1’s value comes from his
private signal. It turns out that in a strategic equilibrium the effects of these two incentives
on the price offset each other when the two ratios are equal, i.e., λ1α2 = λ2α1, restoring the
competitive equilibrium price.
4 Non-existence of Nonlinear Ex Post Equilibria if n > 2
So far, we have characterized a class of nonlinear ex post equilibria for n = 2. A natural
question is whether the equilibrium construction generalizes to a market with n ≥ 3 traders.
We answer this question in the negative by showing that, when all traders’ preferences are
symmetric,5 a nonlinear ex post equilibrium does not exist for n ≥ 4. This non-existence
result also holds if n = 3 and the three symmetric traders have pure private values. For these
non-existence results we restrict attention to demand schedules that are twice continuously
differentiable, globally downward sloping in price, and globally upward sloping in signals,
which are plausible assumptions for practical applications.
5We focus on symmetric traders for the following reason. Rostek and Weretka (2012) show that when
traders are asymmetric, the linear equilibrium is not an ex post equilibrium because the market-clearing
price does not reveal all payoff-relevant information. For this reason, it would be too difficult a task to look
for ex post equilibria with asymmetric traders. But with symmetric traders, ex post equilibrium is a suitable
solution concept as it exactly selects the canonical linear equilibrium in the literature mentioned before (see
Equation (34)).
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In this section, there are n ≥ 3 symmetric traders, with αi = α ∈ (0, 1] and λi = λ > 0,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
vi = αsi +
1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj, (33)
and the utility Ui(qi, p; vi) is still given by Equation (2). As before, the total supply of the
asset is normalized to zero. As in Definition 1, in an ex post equilibrium every trader i would
not deviate from his equilibrium strategy even if he would observe the realization of others’
signals s−i = (s1, . . . si−1, si+1, . . . , sn), if others are following their equilibrium strategies.
It is known from the divisible double auction literature (see Vives (2011), Rostek and
Weretka (2012), and Du and Zhu (2016), among others) that if (and only if) nα > 2, the
following strategy constitutes an ex post equilibrium:
xi(p; si) =
nα− 2
λ(n− 1) (si − p) . (34)
And the equilibrium price is
p∗(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
si. (35)
Proposition 3. Suppose that either (i) n ≥ 4 or (ii) n = 3 and α = 1. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be
an ex post equilibrium such that a market-clearing price p∗(s) exists at every s ∈ [s, s]n, and
xi is twice continuously differentiable,
∂xi
∂p
(p; si) < 0, and
∂xi
∂si
(p; si) > 0 for every si, p and
i. Then, for every s ∈ [s, s]n and every i, at the market-clearing price p = p∗(s), xi(p; si) is
equal to the demand in Equation (34).6
Proposition 3 states a strong and novel uniqueness result: the linear equilibrium in Equa-
tion (34) is the only ex post equilibrium, without a priori restricting to linear or symmetric
strategies. (As usual, for any fixed si, the uniqueness of xi(p; si) in Proposition 3 applies
only to market-clearing prices, i.e., p = p∗(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ [s, s]n−1, since the demands
at non-market-clearing prices need not satisfy any optimality condition.) Proposition 3 thus
provides a justification for the widespread use of the linear equilibrium in the literature.
The parameter conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 cover almost the entire case of n > 2,
with the only exception of {n = 3, α < 1}. Our proof technique does not work for this
rather specific case, and it remains an open question whether nonlinear equilibria exist for
{n = 3, α < 1}.
6The assumption of a compact signal support [s, s]n is not necessary for Proposition 3, since if the ex
post equilibrium condition holds over the signal space [0,∞)n, it also holds over any compact subset [s, s]n,
and Proposition 3 for compact signal support then applies.
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To convey the intuition of Proposition 3 and a flavor of the formal argument, let us
sketch here a key step in the proof. For simplicity, let us assume private values (α = 1)
and n ≥ 3. Fix an ex post equilibrium (x1, . . . , xn) that satisfies the regularity conditions in
Proposition 3. We work with the inverse function of xi(p; · ), to which we refer as s˜i(p; · ).
That is, for any realized allocation yi ∈ R, we have xi(p; s˜i(p; yi)) = yi. Because xi(p; si) is
strictly increasing in si, s˜i(p; yi) is strictly increasing in yi. With an abuse of notation, we
denote ∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) ≡ ∂xi∂p (p; s˜i(p; yi)).
For a signal profile s ∈ (s, s)n, the market-clearing price must be interior (see footnote 10),
so the ex post first order condition is satisfied by (x1, . . . , xn); we write it in terms of the
inverse functions (cf. Equation (14)):
∑
j 6=i
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) =
−yi
s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi , where yi = −
∑
j 6=i
yj. (36)
The above equation holds for all (p, yj)j 6=i ∈ (p¯−, p¯+)×
∏
j 6=i(y¯j−, y¯j+), where (p¯, y¯j)j 6=i
is the realized price and allocations of the signal profile s and  is sufficiently small.7 We
pick any j1 6= i and j2 6= i. In the neighborhood (yj1 , yj2) ∈ (y¯j1− , y¯j1 + )× (y¯j2− , y¯j2 + ),
we differentiate Equation (36) by yj1 (the first equality below) and by yj2 (the last equality
below) to get:
∂
∂yj1
(
∂xj1
∂p
(p; yj1)
)
=
∂
∂yj1
( −yi
s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi
)
=
∂
∂yj2
( −yi
s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi
)
=
∂
∂yj2
(
∂xj2
∂p
(p; yj2)
)
, (37)
where the second equality follows because yi has a coefficient of −1 on both yj1 and yj2 .
Thus, ∂
∂yj1
(
∂xj1
∂p
(p; yj1)
)
and ∂
∂yj2
(
∂xj2
∂p
(p; yj2)
)
can depend only on p. Therefore, we have
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) = G(p)yj +Hj(p) (38)
for every j 6= i. We then substitute Equation (38) back to the ex post first order condition
(36), and this imposes a strong restriction on the functional form of s˜i(p; yi), which can be
satisfied only by a linear function of yi and p. The details can be found in the appendix.
To obtain the functional form in Equation (38), which is an important step in the proof,
it is crucial that there are two independent variables yj1 and yj2 . Hence, Equation (38) does
7If s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi = 0, then yi = 0 by the ex post first order condition; but yi = −
∑
j 6=i yj 6= 0 for a
generic (yj)j 6=i.
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not apply if n = 2. Intuitively, in Equation (37) we are varying sj1 and sj2 in a way that holds
the market-clearing price fixed, and ex post optimality subject to such variation imposes so
strong a restriction on the shape of the equilibrium that only linear strategies satisfy it.
The above argument does not work when α < 1, since then the right-hand side of
Equation (36) would contain s˜j(p; yj). In the appendix we uses an alternative argument for
α < 1 which relies on n ≥ 4.
5 Conclusion
Existing models of divisible double auctions prove to be important tools for analyzing trad-
ing in centralized markets. The existence of their linear equilibria, however, typically require
three or more traders. This requirement limits the applicability of those models in decen-
tralized markets, where each transaction occurs between exactly two traders.
This paper fills this “n = 2” gap. We construct a family of non-linear, ex post equilibria
in divisible double auction with two traders, who have interdependent values and submit
demand schedules. The equilibria are characterized by solutions to algebraic equations.
The equilibrium trading volume is positive but less than the first best. Our results open
the possibility of using bilateral double auctions as a building block for analyzing strategic
trading in decentralized markets of divisible assets.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
A.1.1 Step 1: writing the first order conditions as differential equations.
Given a signal profile (s1, s2), trader i’s ex post optimization problem is essentially selecting
a market-clearing price p and getting the residual supply −xj(p; sj) of trader j 6= i, since
whatever the demand schedule trader i uses, his final allocation must clear the market, i.e.,
equal to −xj(p; sj) at some price p. Let
Πi(p) = (vi − p)(−xj(p; sj))− λi
2
(−xj(p; sj))2, (39)
which is trader i’s payoff given residual supply −xj(p; sj). We construct (x1, x2) such that
the following ex post first order conditions are always satisfied: for every (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2,
i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i,
Π′i(p
∗) = xj(p∗; sj) + (αisi + (1− αi)sj − p∗ + λixj(p∗; sj))
(
−∂xj
∂p
(p∗; sj)
)
= 0,
x1(p
∗; s1) + x2(p∗; s2) = 0, (40)
where p∗ ≡ p∗(s1, s2) is the market-clearing price. Note that trader i’s demand xi cannot
depend on sj; this distinguishes an ex post equilibrium from a full-sharing equilibrium in
which traders truthfully share their signals s1 and s2 before trading. Trader i must infer
sj from the market-clearing price p
∗. The price inference is accomplished by the following
conjecture on the market-clearing price:
p∗ = as1 + (1− a)s2 + Λx1(p∗; s1) (41)
where a and Λ are constants to be uniquely determined in Step 2. We also verify Conjecture
(41) in Step 2. Intuitively, the equilibrium price should be a linear function of the signals and
the equilibrium demand, since each trader’s marginal value depends on a weighted average
of signals and decreases linearly with quantity, as can be seen in Equation (40). Thus
Conjecture (41) is a natural starting point.
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Given Conjecture (41), we have
v1 − p∗ + λ1x2(p∗; s2) = α1(s1 − p∗) + (1− α1)(s2 − p∗) + λ1x2(p∗; s2)
= −α1
a
((1− a)(s2 − p∗) + Λx1(p∗; s1)) + (1− α1)(s2 − p∗) + λ1x2(p∗; s2)
=
(
α1
1− a
a
− (1− α1)
)
(p∗ − s2) +
(α1
a
Λ + λ1
)
x2(p
∗; s2), (42)
and
v2 − p∗ + λ2x1(p∗; s1) =
(
α2
a
1− a − (1− α2)
)
(p∗ − s1) +
(
− α2
1− aΛ + λ2
)
x1(p
∗; s2).
(43)
Intuitively, in Equations (42) and (43) the value vi is inferred from the market-clearing
price using Conjecture (41). A subtlety here is that the inference on vi is made with the
variables of trader j. This is because we want to rewrite the first order condition of trader i
in (40) as a differential equation that involves only trader j, j 6= i:
x1(p
∗; s1) =
((
α2
a
1− a − (1− α2)
)
(p∗ − s1) +
(
λ2 − α2
1− aΛ
)
x1(p
∗; s1)
)
∂x1
∂p
(p∗; s1),
(44)
x2(p
∗; s2) =
((
α1
1− a
a
− (1− α1)
)
(p∗ − s2) +
(
λ1 +
α1
a
Λ
)
x2(p
∗; s2)
)
∂x2
∂p
(p∗; s2). (45)
Thus, we have two differential equations that can be solved separately. If Equation (44)
holds for every (s1, p
∗) ∈ [s, s]2 and Equation (45) for every (s2, p∗) ∈ [s, s]2, and if the
market-clearing price satisfies Conjecture (41), then the first order conditions in Equation
(40) must also hold for every (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2.
To solve Equations (44) and (45), we first solve a simpler equation:
y(w) = (ηw − λy(w))y′(w), y(0) = 0, y′(w) > 0 for w ∈ (0, s− s], (46)
where η and λ are constants. Then, set
η = α2
a
1− a − (1− α2), λ = λ2 −
α2
1− aΛ, (47)
w = |s1 − p∗|, x1(p∗; s1) = y(|s1 − p∗|) · sign(s1 − p),
we see that for every (s1, p
∗) Equations (44) is satisfied since ∂x1
∂p
(p∗; s1) = −y′(|s1 − p∗|).
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Likewise for Equations (45).
Lemma 1. Suppose that 0 < η < 1 and λ > 0. The differential equation
y(w) = (ηw − λy(w))y′(w) (48)
is solved by the implicit solution to:
(1− η)w = Cy(w)η − λy(w), (49)
where C is a positive constant. If
C ≥
(
λ
η
)η
(s− s)1−η, (50)
we can select y(w) that solves (49) such that y(0) = y′(0) = 0, y(w) > 0, y′(w) > 0 and
y′′(w) > 0 for every w ∈ (0, s− s].
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show the solution of the differential equation (48) is implicitly
defined by (49). For notional simplicity let us suppress the dependence of y on w and rewrite
(48) as:
y dw + (λy − ηw) dy = 0. (51)
We use the standard integrating factor technique to convert (51) into an exact differential
equation; that is, multiplying both sides of (51) by the integrating factor e
∫
(−η−1)/y dy =
y−1−η, we get:
y−η dw + y−1−η(λy − ηw) dy = 0, (52)
which is an exact differential equation since ∂
∂y
(y−η) = ∂
∂w
(y−1−η(λy − ηw)). Thus, there
exists a function F (y, w) such that ∂F
∂y
= y−1−η(λy−ηw) and ∂F
∂w
= y−η; it is easy to see that
F (y, w) = y−ηw + λ
y1−η
1− η . (53)
Thus, the solution is implicitly defined by
y−ηw + λ
y1−η
1− η = K (54)
for a constant K. Letting C ≡ K(1− η), it is easy to see that (54) is equivalent to (49).
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For the second part, let
f(y) = Cyη − λy. (55)
The function f is clearly strictly concave and obtains its maximum at
y∗ =
(
Cη
λ
) 1
1−η
. (56)
We choose C > 0 so that
f(y∗) = C
(
Cη
λ
) η
1−η
− λ
(
Cη
λ
) 1
1−η
= C
1
1−η
(η
λ
) η
1−η
(1− η) ≥ (1− η)(s− s) (57)
which is equivalent to (50). Given this choice of C, for every w ∈ [0, s−s], by the Intermediate
Value Theorem there is a unique y(w) ∈ [0, y∗] that solves f(y(w)) = (1 − η)w. Since
f ′(y(w)) > 0 for y(w) ∈ (0, y∗), we have y′(w) = 1−η
f ′(y(w)) > 0 for w ∈ (0, s− s]. And clearly,
y′(0) = 0 if η < 1.
Finally, we differentiate both sides of (48) to obtain:
y′(w) = (ηw − λy(w))y′′(w) + (η − λy′(w))y′(w), (58)
i.e.,
(ηw − λy(w))y′′(w) = (1− η)y′(w) + λy′(w)2. (59)
Since y′(w) > 0 and ηw − λy(w) = y(w)
y′(w) > 0, we conclude that y
′′(w) > 0 for w > 0.
A.1.2 Step 2: deriving the equilibrium strategy.
For w1, w2 ∈ [0, s− s], let y1(w1) and y2(w2), be implicitly defined by (via Lemma 1):(
1− α2 a
1− a + (1− α2)
)
w1 = C1y1(w1)
α2
a
1−a−(1−α2) −
(
λ2 − α2
1− aΛ
)
y1(w1), (60)(
1− α11− a
a
+ (1− α1)
)
w2 = C2y2(w2)
α1
1−a
a
−(1−α1) −
(
λ1 +
α1
a
Λ
)
y2(w2), (61)
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and suppose the conditions in the second part of Lemma 1 are satisfied. Define the following
strategies:
x1(p; s1) = y1(|s1 − p|) · sign(s1 − p), (62)
x2(p; s2) = y2(|s2 − p|) · sign(s2 − p). (63)
Let w1 = |s1 − p∗| and w2 = |s2 − p∗|, we rewrite Conjecture (41) as
aw1 − (1− a)w2 + Λy(w1) = 0. (64)
Clearly, Equation (60) is equivalent to(
1− α2 a
1− a + (1− α2)
)(
w1 +
Λ
a
y1(w1)
)
(65)
=C1y1(w1)
α2
a
1−a−(1−α2) −
(
λ2 − α2
1− aΛ−
(
1− α2 a
1− a + (1− α2)
)
Λ
a
)
y1(w1).
By the definition of the market-clearing price p∗, we have y(w1) = y(w2). Thus, to satisfy
both Equations (61) and (65), Conjecture (64), and y(w1) = y(w2), we must have the same
exponent in Equations (61) and (65):
α2
a
1− a − (1− α2) = α1
1− a
a
− (1− α1), (66)
i.e.,
a =
α1
α1 + α2
. (67)
To satisfy Conjecture (64), we make Equation (61) equal to a
1−a =
α1
α2
times Equation
(65):
C1 = α2C, C2 = α1C, (68)
for a constant C > 0, and
λ1 +
α1
a
Λ =
α1
α2
(
λ2 − α2
1− aΛ−
(
1− α2 a
1− a + (1− α2)
)
Λ
a
)
, (69)
i.e.,
Λ =
α1λ2 − α2λ1
2(α1 + α2)
. (70)
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Substituting (67), (68) and (70) into (60) and (61) gives:
(2− α1 − α2)w1 = Cα2y1(w1)α1+α2−1 −
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)
y1(w1), (71)
(2− α1 − α2)w2 = Cα1y2(w2)α1+α2−1 −
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
)
y2(w2). (72)
The following lemma gives conditions that guarantee the existence of market-clearing
price.
Lemma 2. Suppose that
C ≥ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α2
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
, and (73)
C ≥ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α1
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
. (74)
Then for every profile (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2, there exists a unique p∗ ∈ [s, s] that satisfies x1(p∗; s1)+
x2(p
∗; s2) = 0; that is, there exist unique w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0 such that w1 + w2 = |s1 − s2|
and y1(w1) = y2(w2).
Proof. By Lemma 1, conditions (73) and (74) give y1 : [0, s−s]→ [0,∞) and y2 : [0, s−s]→
[0,∞), respectively, that are strictly increasing and convex.
Without loss of generality, suppose that s2 < s1. There exists a minimum y¯ > 0 that
solves:8
(2− α1 − α2)(s1 − s2) = C(α1 + α2)y¯α1+α2−1 − (λ1 + λ2) y¯. (75)
Let w1 satisfies
(2− α1 − α2)w1 = Cα2y¯α1+α2−1 −
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)
y¯, (76)
8By construction, we have
(2− α1 − α2)(s1 − s2) = Cα2yα1+α2−1 −
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)
y
when y = y1(s1 − s2), and
(2− α1 − α2)(s1 − s2) = Cα1yα1+α2−1 −
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
)
y
when y = y2(s1−s2). Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a y¯ ≤ min(y1(s1−s2), y2(s1−
s2)) that satisfies Equation (75).
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and let w2 satisfies
(2− α1 − α2)w2 = Cα1y¯α1+α2−1 −
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
)
y¯. (77)
Clearly, we have w1 > 0, w2 > 0 and w1 +w2 = s1− s2. Let p∗ = s2 +w1. Then we have
w1 = p
∗ − s2, w2 = s1 − p∗, and y1(w1) = y2(w2) = y¯, i.e., x1(p∗; s1) = −x2(p∗; s2).
Finally, the uniqueness of p∗ follows from the fact that both x1(p; s1) and x2(p; s2) are
strictly decreasing in p.
A.1.3 Step 3: verifying ex post optimality.
Finally, we directly verify the ex post optimality of the profile (x1, x2) constructed in Step
2. We will show that
Πi(p
∗) ≥ Πi(p), (78)
for every p ∈ [s, s] and every (s1, s2) ∈ [s, s]2, where Πi is defined in Equation (39).
Without loss of generality, fix i = 1 and s2 < s1. By construction, we have s2 < p
∗ < s1,
x1(p
∗; s1) = −x2(p∗; s2) > 0. Since x1(p∗; s1) > 0, the first order condition (40) implies that
v1 − p∗ − λ1x1(p∗; s1) = v1 − p∗ + λ1x2(p∗; s2) > 0. (79)
For later reference let p¯ ∈ (p∗, s) be such that
v1 − p¯+ λ1x2(p¯; s2) = 0. (80)
We note that
Π′1(p) = (v1 − p+ λ1x2(p; s2))
(
−∂x2
∂p
(p; s2)
)
+ x2(p; s2) < 0 (81)
for p ≥ p¯. Thus, Π1(p) cannot be maximized by p ∈ [p¯, s].
We have
Π1(p
∗) =
∫ x1(p∗;s1)
0
(v1 − p∗ − λ1q) dq > 0. (82)
On the other hand, when p ≤ s2, we have x2(p; s2) ≥ 0, hence Π1(p) ≤ 0. Thus, Π1(p)
cannot be maximized by p ∈ [s, s2].
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For p ∈ (s2, s], we have x2(p; s2) = −y2(p− s2), and hence:
Π′1(p) =(v1 − p− λ1y2(p− s2))y′2(p− s2)− y2(p− s2) (83)
=(v1 − p− λ1y2(p− s2))y′2(p− s2)
− ((α1 + α2 − 1)(p− s2)− (λ1 + (α1 + α2)Λ)y2(p− s2))y′2(p− s2)
=(v1 − p− (α1 + α2 − 1)(p− s2) + (α1 + α2)Λy2(p− s2))y′2(p− s2)
where the second line follows by the differential equation in (46). Since y′(p − s2) > 0 for
p > s2, Π
′
1(p) = 0 for p > s2 if and only if
v1 − p− (α1 + α2 − 1)(p− s2) + (α1 + α2)Λy2(p− s2) = 0 (84)
for p > s2.
We distinguish between two cases:
1. When Λ ≤ 0, the left-hand side of (84) is strictly decreasing in p, since by Lemma 1
y(p− s2) is strictly increasing in p. Thus, Equation (84) has only one solution: p = p∗
(by the construction in Step 1 and 2, we have Π′1(p
∗) = 0).
2. When Λ > 0, the left-hand side of (84) is strictly convex in p, since by Lemma 1
y(p − s2) is strictly convex in p. Thus, Equation (84) has at most two solutions (one
of the solutions is p = p∗). However, we know that for any p ≥ p¯, the left-hand side of
the (84) is negative, since Π′1(p) < 0 (see Equation (81)). Therefore, p = p
∗ is the only
solution to (84).
Therefore, Equation (84) has only one solution on (s2, s]: p = p
∗. This implies that
Π′1(p) = 0 has only one solution on (s2, s]: p = p
∗. Since the maximum point of Πi(p) over
[s, s] cannot be in [s, s2] or in [p¯, s], it must be in (s2, p¯) and satisfies Π
′
i(p) = 0. We thus
conclude that p = p∗ maximizes Πi(p) over all p ∈ [s, s].
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
The proof of Corollary 2 follows the same steps as that of Proposition 1, with the following
modifications:
• In Step 1, Lemma 1, we solve the differential equation:
y(w) = (w − λy(w))y′(w), (85)
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whose solution is given by the implicit equation
w = Cy(w)− λy(w) log(y(w)), (86)
where C is a constant. If
C ≥ λ
(
log
s− s
λ
+ 1
)
, (87)
the implicit solution y(w) can be selected to satisfy the second part of Lemma 1.
• In Step 2, we have a = 1/2, and we let y1(w1) and y2(w2), where w1, w2 ≥ 0, be
implicitly defined by
w1 = C1y1(w1)− (λ2 − 2Λ)y1(w1) log(y1(w1)), (88)
w2 = C2y2(w2)− (λ1 + 2Λ)y2(w2) log(y2(w2)), (89)
where Equation (88) is equivalent to
w1 + 2Λy1(w1) = (C1 + 2Λ)y1(w1)− (λ2 − 2Λ)y1(w1) log(y1(w1)). (90)
To satisfy Condition (64), we let
C1 + 2Λ = C2, λ2 − 2Λ = λ1 + 2Λ, (91)
i.e.,
Λ =
λ2 − λ1
4
. (92)
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Without loss let (x1, x2) be the most aggressive equilibrium in Proposition 1. By definition,
sup(p,si)∈[s,s]2 |xi(p; si)| = yi(s − s). Suppose i = 1. Let f1(y1) be defined by Equation (11),
i.e., the right-hand side of Equation (8). The maximum of f1(y1) is at
y∗1 =
(
Cα2(α1 + α2 − 1)
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
)1/(2−α1−α2)
. (93)
By definition, y1(s − s) ≤ y∗1. As α1 + α2 → 1, the constant C for the most aggressive
equilibrium is bounded above, so the corollary follows.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The second part of the proposition follows by an easy comparison of prices and is omitted.
Let us denote
qc ≡ |xc1(pc; s1)| =
(α1 + α2 − 1)|s1 − s2|
λ1 + λ2
, (94)
which is the amount of trading (in absolute value) in the ex post efficient allocation.
Let q∗(C) ≡ |x1(p∗; s1)| be the amount of trading (in absolute value) in an ex post
equilibrium (x1, x2) from Proposition 1, where the constant C satisfies Conditions (5) and
(6). Let us also define
f(y) ≡ C(α1 + α2)yα1+α2−1 − (λ1 + λ2)y. (95)
In Lemma 2 (Section A.1.2) we show that y = q∗(C) is the smaller solution to
(2− α1 − α2)|s1 − s2| = f(y), (96)
before f(y) reaches its maximum.9
We show that f(qc) > (2− α1 − α2)|s1 − s2|, where f is defined in Equation (95). Since
y = q∗(C) is the smaller solution to f(y) = (2− α1 − α2)|s1 − s2|, we must have q∗(C) < qc,
which proves the first part of the proposition.
Clearly, f(qc) > (2− α1 − α2)|s1 − s2| is equivalent to:
C >
|s1 − s2|2−α1−α2
α1 + α2
(
λ1 + λ2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
. (97)
Let us define:
C1 ≡ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α2
(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
, (98)
C2 ≡ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α1
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
, (99)
C ≡ (s− s)
2−α1−α2
α1 + α2
(
λ1 + λ2
α1 + α2 − 1
)α1+α2−1
. (100)
We claim that max(C1, C2) > C. For the sake of contradiction, suppose max(C1, C2) ≤ C;
9It is straightforward to show that given Conditions (5) and (6), there always exist two solutions to (96),
one before and one after f(y) reaches the maximum.
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this implies: (
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
λ1 + λ2
)α1+α2−1
≤ α2
α1 + α2(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
λ1 + λ2
)α1+α2−1
≤ α1
α1 + α2
,
which implies(
λ2
(
1− α1
2
)
+ λ1
α2
2
λ1 + λ2
)α1+α2−1
+
(
λ1
(
1− α2
2
)
+ λ2
α1
2
λ1 + λ2
)α1+α2−1
≤ 1,
which is clearly false given 0 < α1 + α2 − 1 < 1.
Hence Conditions (5) and (6), which state that C ≥ max(C1, C2), imply that C > C,
which implies (97).
B Proof of Proposition 3
B.1 Existence of Linear Equilibrium
We conjecture a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn). For notational convenience, we define
β ≡ 1− α
n− 1 . (101)
Given that all other bidders use this strategy profile and for a fixed profile of signals
(s1, . . . , sn), the profit of bidder i at the price of p is
Πi(p) =
(
αsi + β
∑
j 6=i
sj − p
)(
−
∑
j 6=i
xj(p; sj)
)
− 1
2
λ
(
−
∑
j 6=i
xj(p; sj)
)2
.
We can see that bidder i is effectively selecting an optimal price p. Taking the first-order
condition of Πi(p) at p = p
∗, we have, for all i,
0 = Π′i(p
∗) = −xi(p∗; si) +
(
αsi + β
∑
j 6=i
sj − p∗ − λxi(p∗; si)
)(
−
∑
j 6=i
∂xj
∂p
(p∗; sj)
)
. (102)
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Therefore, an ex post equilibrium corresponds to a solution {xi} to the first-order condition
(102), such that for each i, xi depends only on si and p.
We conjecture a symmetric linear demand schedule:
xj(p; sj) = asj − bp+ c, (103)
where a 6= 0, b, and c are constants. In this conjectured equilibrium, all bidders j 6= i use
the strategy (103). Thus, we can rewrite the each bidder j’s signal sj in terms of his demand
xj: ∑
j 6=i
sj =
∑
j 6=i
xj(p
∗; sj) + bp∗ − c
a
=
1
a
(−xi(p∗; si) + (n− 1)(bp∗ − c)) ,
where we have also used the market clearing condition. Substituting the above equation into
bidder i’s first order condition (102) and rearranging, we have
xi(p
∗; si) =
α(n− 1)bsi − (n− 1)b [1− β(n− 1)b/a] p∗ − (n− 1)cβ(n− 1)b/a
1 + λ(n− 1)b+ β(n− 1)b/a
≡ asi − bp∗ + c.
Matching the coefficients and using the normalization that α + (n− 1)β = 1, we solve
a = b =
1
λ
· nα− 2
n− 1 , c = 0.
It is easy to verify that under this linear strategy, Π′′i ( · ) = −n(n− 1)αb < 0 if nα > 2. We
thus have a linear ex post equilibrium.
B.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We fix an ex post equilibrium strategy (x1, . . . , xn) such that for every i, xi is twice contin-
uously differentiable, ∂xi
∂p
(p; si) < 0 and
∂xi
∂si
(p; si) > 0 for every (p, s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (s, s)n+1.
Fix an arbitrary s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (s, s)n. It is easy to see that p∗(s) ∈ (s, s).10 We will
prove that there exist a δ′ > 0 sufficiently small and constants a, b, and c such that
xi(p; s
′
i) = as
′
i − bp+ c (104)
holds for every p ∈ (p∗(s)− δ′, p∗(s) + δ′), s′i ∈ (si − δ′, si + δ′), and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
10 For the sake of contradiction suppose p∗ = s. Then the trader i with xi(p∗; si) ≤ 0 would strictly prefer
a higher price, which contradicts the ex post optimality. Likewise for p∗ = s.
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Once (104) is established, the values of a, b and c are pinned down by the construction
of linear equilibrium in Section B.1; in particular, the values of a, b and c are independent
of (s1, . . . , sn) and of δ
′. Since s = (s1, . . . , sn) is arbitrary, the same constants a, b, and c in
(104) apply to any s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (s, s)n and p = p∗(s). Finally for s on the boundary of
[s, s]n, we take an approximating sequence of signal profiles from the interior and uses the
continuity of xi(p; si). This proves the uniqueness in Proposition 3.
To prove (104), we work with the inverse function of xi(p; · ), to which we refer as s˜i(p; · ).
That is, for any realized allocation yi ∈ R, we have xi(p; s˜i(p; yi)) = yi. Because xi(p; si) is
strictly increasing in si, s˜i(p; yi) is strictly increasing in yi. Throughout the proof, we will
denote trader i’s realized allocation by yi and his demand schedule by xi( · ; · ). With an
abuse of notation, we denote ∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) ≡ ∂xi∂p (p; s˜i(p; yi)).
Fix s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (s, s)n. Let p¯ = p∗(s) and y¯i = xi(p∗(s); si). By continuity, there
exists some δ > 0 such that, for any i and any (p, yi) ∈ (p¯− δ, p¯+ δ)× (y¯i − δ, y¯i + δ), there
exists some s′i ∈ (s, s) such that xi(p; s′i) = yi. In other words, every price and allocation
pair in (p¯− δ, p¯+ δ)× (y¯i − δ, y¯i + δ) is “realizable” given some signal.
We will prove that there exist constants A 6= 0, B 6= 0, and C such that
s˜i(p; yi) = Ayi +Bp+ C (105)
for every (p, yi) ∈ (p¯ − δ, p¯ + δ) × (y¯i − δ/n, y¯i + δ/n), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, this implies
(104). We now proceed to prove (105). There are two cases. In Case 1, α < 1 and n ≥ 4.
In Case 2, α = 1 and n ≥ 3.
B.2.1 Case 1: α < 1 and n ≥ 4
The proof for Case 1 consists of two steps.
Step 1 of Case 1: Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 below imply equation (105).
We now restrict yj to (y¯j − δ/n, y¯j + δ/n), j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, so that yn = −
∑n−1
j=1 yj ∈
(y¯n − δ, y¯n + δ), and as a result s˜(p; yn) and ∂xn∂p (p; yn) are well-defined.
Lemma 3. There exist functions A(p), {Bi(p)} such that
s˜i(p; yi) = A(p)yi +Bi(p), (106)
holds for every p ∈ (p¯− δ, p¯+ δ) and every yi ∈ (y¯i − δ/n, y¯i + δ/n), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. This lemma is proved in Step 2 of Case 1. For this lemma we need the condition that
n ≥ 4; in the rest of the proof n ≥ 3 suffices.
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Lemma 4. Suppose that l ≥ 2 and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, Yi is an open subset of R, P is an
arbitrary set, and fi(p; yi) is a differentiable function of yi ∈ Yi for every p ∈ P . Moreover,
suppose that
l∑
i=1
fi(p; yi) = fl+1
(
p;
l∑
i=1
yi
)
, (107)
for every p ∈ P and (y1, . . . , yl) ∈
∏l
i=1 Yi. Then there exist functions G(p) and {Hi(p)}
such that
fi(p; yi) = G(p)yi +Hi(p)
holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, p ∈ P and yi ∈ Yi.
Proof. We differentiate (107) with respect to yi and to yj, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and
obtain
∂fi
∂yi
(p; yi) =
∂fl+1
∂yi
(
p;
l∑
j=1
yj
)
=
∂fj
∂yj
(p; yj)
for any yi ∈ Yi and yj ∈ Yj. Because (y1, . . . , yl) are arbitrary, the partial derivatives
above cannot depend on any particular yi. Thus, there exists some function G(p) such that
∂fi
∂yi
(p; yi) = G(p) for all yi. Lemma 4 then follows.
In Step 1 of the proof of Case 1 of Proposition 3, we show that Lemma 3 and Lemma 4
imply equation (105). Define
β ≡ (1− α)
n− 1 , (108)
and rewrite trader i’s ex post first-order condition as:
− yi +
(
αs˜i(p; yi) + β
∑
j 6=i
s˜j(p; yj)− p− λyi
)(
−
∑
j 6=i
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj)
)
= 0, (109)
where yn = −
∑n−1
j=1 yj, p ∈ (p¯− δ, p¯+ δ) and yj ∈ (y¯j − δ/n, y¯j + δ/n).
Our strategy is to repeatedly apply Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to (109) in order to arrive
at (105).
First, we plug the functional form of Lemma 3 into (109). Without loss of generality, we
let i = n and rewrite (109) as
n−1∑
j=1
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
left-hand side of (107)
= − yn
α(A(p)yn +Bn(p)) + β
∑n−1
j=1 (A(p)yj +Bj(p))− p− λyn︸ ︷︷ ︸
right-hand side of (107)
.
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Applying Lemma 4 to the above equation, we see that there exist functions G(p) and {Hj(p)}
such that
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) = G(p)yj +Hj(p), (110)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. Note that we have used the condition n ≥ 3 when applying Lemma 3.
By the same argument, we apply Lemma 4 to (109) for i = 1, and conclude that (110)
holds for j = n as well.
Using (106) and (110), we rewrite trader i’s ex post first-order condition as:(
(α− β)s˜i(p; yi) + β
(
n∑
j=1
Bj(p)
)
− p− λyi
)(
−G(p)(−yi)−
∑
j 6=i
Hj(p)
)
−yi = 0. (111)
Solving for s˜i(p; yi) in terms of p and yi from equation (111), we see that for the solution
to be consistent with (106), we must have G(p) = 0. Otherwise, i.e. if G(p) 6= 0, then (111)
implies that s˜i(p; yi) contains the term yi/
(
−G(p)(−yi)−
∑
j 6=iHj(p)
)
, contradicting the
linear form of Lemma 3.
Inverting (106), we see that xi(p; si) = (si − Bi(p))/A(p). Therefore, for ∂xi∂p (p; si) to be
independent of si (i.e., G(p) = 0), A(p) must be a constant function, i.e. A(p) = A for some
constant A ∈ R. This implies that
Hi(p) = −B
′
i(p)
A
, (112)
by the definition of Hi(p) in (110).
Given G(p) = 0 and A(p) = A, (111) can be rewritten as
(α− β)s˜i(p; yi) + β
(
n∑
j=1
Bj(p)
)
− p− λyi − yi−∑j 6=iHj(p) = 0. (113)
For (113) to be consistent with s˜i(p; yi) = Ayi + Bi(p), we must have that Hj(p) = Hj for
some constants Hj, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and that
1∑
j 6=iHj
=
1∑
j 6=i′ Hj
, for all i 6= i′,
which implies that for all i, Hi = H for the same constant H.
By (112), this means that Bi(p) = Bp + Ci, where B = −HA, and {Ci} are some
constants. Finally, (113) implies that for all i, Ci = C for the same constant C.
Hence, we have shown that Lemma 3 implies (105). This completes Step 1 of the proof
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of Case 1 of Proposition 3. In Step 2 below, we prove Lemma 3.
Step 2 of Case 1: Proof of Lemma 3.
Trader n’s ex post first order condition can be written as:
n−1∑
j=1
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) = − yn
αs˜n(p; yn) + β
∑n−1
j=1 s˜j(p; yj)− p− λyn
, (114)
where yn = −
∑n−1
j=1 yj. Differentiating (114) with respect to yi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, gives:
∂
∂yi
(
∂xi
∂p
(p; yi)
)
=
Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1) + yn
(
−α ∂s˜n
∂yn
(p; yn) + β
∂s˜i
∂yi
(p; yi) + λ
)
Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1)2
, (115)
where
Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1) = αs˜n(p; yn) + β
n−1∑
j=1
s˜j(p; yj)− p− λyn. (116)
Solving for Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1) in (115), we get
Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1) = ρi
(
yi,
n−1∑
j=1
yj
)
(117)
for some function ρi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
We let ρi,1 be the partial derivative of ρi with respect to its first argument, and let ρi,2
be the partial derivative of ρi with respect to its second argument. For each pair of distinct
i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, differentiating Γ(y1, . . . , yn−1) = ρi
(
yi,
∑n−1
j=1 yj
)
= ρk
(
yk,
∑n−1
j=1 yj
)
with respect to yi and to yk, we have
dΓ(y1, . . . , yn−1)
dyi
= ρi,1 + ρi,2 = ρk,2,
dΓ(y1, . . . , yn−1)
dyk
= ρk,1 + ρk,2 = ρi,2,
which imply that for all i 6= k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
ρi,1 + ρk,1 = 0. (118)
Choose any three distinct i, j and k from {1, . . . , n − 1}, we have ρi,1 = −ρj,1 = ρk,1 =
−ρi,1; here we have used n ≥ 4. Thus we have ρi,1 = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. That is,
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each ρi is only a function of its second argument:
ρi
(
yi,
n−1∑
j=1
yj
)
= ρi
(
n−1∑
j=1
yj
)
. (119)
Then, using (116), (117) and (119) for i = 1, we have
β
n−1∑
j=1
s˜j(p; yj) = ρ1
(
n−1∑
j=1
yj
)
+ p+ λyn − αs˜n(p; yn). (120)
Applying Lemma 4 to (120) (recall that yn = −
∑n−1
j=1 yj), we conclude that, for all j ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1},
s˜j(p; yj) = A(p)yj +Bj(p). (121)
Finally, we repeat this argument to trader 1’s ex post first-order condition and conclude that
(121) holds for j = n as well. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
B.2.2 Case 2: α = 1 and n ≥ 3
We now prove Case 2 of Proposition 3. Trader n’s ex post first order condition in this case
is:
n−1∑
j=1
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) =
−yn
s˜n(p; yn)− p− λyn , (122)
for every p ∈ (p¯ − δ, p¯ + δ) and (y1, . . . , yn−1) ∈
∏n−1
j=1 (y¯j − δ/n, y¯j + δ/n), and where
yn = −
∑n−1
j=1 yj.
Applying Lemma 4 to (122) gives:
∂xj
∂p
(p; yj) = G(p)yj +Hj(p), (123)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Applying Lemma 4 to the ex post first-order condition of trader 1
shows that (123) holds for j = n as well.
Substituting (123) back into the first-order condition (122), we obtain:
(s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi)
(
−G(p)(−yi)−
∑
j 6=i
Hj(p)
)
− yi = 0,
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which can be rewritten as:
∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) = G(p)yi +Hi(p) =
yi
s˜i(p; yi)− p− λyi +
n∑
j=1
Hj(p). (124)
We claim that G(p) = 0. Suppose for contradiction that G(p) 6= 0. Then matching the
coefficient of yi in (124), we must have s˜i(p; yi) = λyi + Bi(p) for some function Bi(p). But
this implies that ∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) = −B′i(p)/λ, which is independent of yi. This implies G(p) = 0,
a contradiction. Thus, G(p) = 0.
Then, (124) implies that s˜i(p; yi) − p = Ai(p)yi for some function Ai(p). And since
∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) is independent of yi, Ai(p) must be a constant function, i.e., s˜i(p; yi)− p = Aiyi for
some Ai ∈ R. Substitute this back to (124) gives:
∂xi
∂p
(p; yi) = − 1
Ai
=
1
Ai − λ −
n∑
j=1
1
Aj
,
which implies
1
Ai − λ −
1
Aj − λ =
1
Aj
− 1
Ai
, for all i 6= j,
which is only possible if Ai = Aj ≡ A ∈ R for all i 6= j. Thus, s˜i(p; yi) − p = Ayi, which
concludes the proof of this case.
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